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Salt Lake City

November 2, 1994
Ms. Marilyn Branch
Clerk of the Court
Utah Court of Appeals
230 South 500 East, #400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Re:

FILED
NOV 4 1994

COURT OF APPEALS

Joe D. Trembly v. Mrs. Fields Cookies. Case No. 930635-CA

Dear Ms. Branch:
On September 21, 1994, the court heard oral argument in the above-captioned case.
Thereafter, I became aware of a recently issued Utah Supreme Court decision relevant to this
case, in particular the argument raised by my client, appellee, Mrs. Fields Cookies, in its
brief regarding the trial court's reconsideration of a prior decision denying summary
judgment. See Brief of Appellee, at pp.7-8. Pursuant to Rule 24(i) of the Utah Rules of
Appellate Practice, I write to inform you of this case.
On September 20, 1994, in Ron Shepherd Insurance v. Shields. 248 Utah Adv. Rep.
3 (Sept. 20, 1994, Utah), the Utah Supreme Court ruled that a subsequently assigned district
court judge may rule on a motion for summary judgment despite the fact that the previously
assigned judge entered an unsigned minute order granting the same. The Utah Supreme
Court wrote "[i]t is settled law that a trial court is free to reassess its decision at any point
prior to entry of a final order or judgment." id. at 6. Shepherd makes clear that a trial court
may consider reargument of a party's position on a summary judgment motion "at any point
prior to entry of a final order or judgment." Id. at fh 4. A copy of the Shepherd case is
attached for your convenience.
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Also, by way of information, during appellant's reply oral argument, appellant's
counsel, Mr. Fericks, represented to the court that Mrs. Fields Cookies continues to use the
video "What We Stand For". This statement is simply incorrect and not supported by the
record.
Very truly yours,

Deno G. Himonas
Enclosure
cc:
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Russell Fericks
Michael Ward

UTAH STATc
LAW UBF4RV
This opinion is subject to revision before final
publication in the Pacific Reporter.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
00O00

Ron Shepherd Insurance, a
Utah corporation,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
V,

No. 930475

William Scott Shields,
Jeffrey G. Shields, Donald R.
Mayer, and Universal Business
Insurance, Inc., a Utah
corporation,
Defendants and Appellees.

F I L E D
September 20, 1994

Ronald Shepherd Insurance, Inc.,
a Utah corporation, and Ron
Shepherd, an individual,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
v.
William Gerald Shields, Marilyn
Shields, Jeffrey Shields, William
Scott Shields, Jack Turner, and
Universal Business Insurance, Inc.,
a Utah corporation,
Defendants and Appellees.

Geoffrey J. Butler, Clerk

Third District, Salt Lake County
The Honorable John A. Rokich
Attorneys:

Thomas R. Blonquist, Salt Lake City, for plaintiffs
M. David Eckersley, Salt Lake City, for defendants

RUSSON, Justice:
Plaintiffs Ronald Lee Shepherd and Ron Shepherd
Insurance, Inc. (RSI), appeal from the trial court's denial of
their motion entitled "Motion for Reconsideration" and its entry
of summary judgment in favor of defendants William Gerald
Shields, Marilyn Shields, William Scott Shields, Jeffrey Shields,

Donald R. Mayer, and Universal Business Insurance, Inc.
reverse and remand.

We

FACTS
On December 13, 1988, Shields;Insurance, Inc., entered
into a written agreement with a company recalled Insurance, Inc. ,
in which Insurance, Inc., agreed to assume $200,000 of debts owed
to the creditors of Shields Insurance,cine., in exchange for an
agreement that the agents of Shields^Insurance, Inc., would
(1) transact no further business under the name of Shields
Insurance, Inc., and (2) sign over, all checks to and write all
new business through Insurance, Inc. The agreement further
stated:
6. Amendment. Neither this Agreement
nor any term [or] provision hereof may be
changed, waived, discharged or terminated
orally or in any manner other than by an
instrument in writing signed by the parties
hereto.
The agreement was signed by William Gerald Shields, Marilyn
Shields, William Scott Shields, and Jeffrey Shields on behalf of
Shields Insurance, Inc., and by Ron Shepherd on behalf of
Insurance, Inc.
Shortly thereafter, due to Insurance, Inc.'s inability
to obtain appointments from major insurance companies to write
insurance, Ron Shepherd and the Shieldses orally agreed that
(1) RSI would assume Insurance, Inc.'s rights and
responsibilities under the above agreement, and (2) the agents of
Shields Insurance, Inc., would write all new business through
RSI, instead of Insurance, Inc. From December 13, 1988, to
May 26, 1990, all of the Shieldses7 insurance transactions showed
RSI as the "agent of record."
On May 26, 1990, William Scott Shields, Jeffrey
Shields, and another insurance agent, Donald R. Mayer, removed
1

Plaintiffs additionally brought suit against Jeffrey
Shields' father-in-law, Jack Turner, for failure to pay his
portion of the debts owed to the creditors of Shields Insurance,
Inc., pursuant to an agreement between Turner and Ron Shepherd.
However, since defendants' motion for summary judgment does not
address Turners liability, that cause of action is not before us
on appeal.
2

Insurance, Inc., was a Utah corporation incorporated in
1981. It is not a party to these proceedings because it was
dissolved in June 1988 for failure to pay franchise taxes and
file an annual statement.
No. 930475
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over 600 f i i ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ t h e offices of RSI and transported them to
Universal>Business^Insurance, Inc., an insurance agency
establishedrtoy^the two Shieldses and Mayer. In response to the
removal^joftlthe^fil^s/ plaintiffs filed two actions against
defendants:/-one for a writ of replevin ordering the two
Shieldses and Mayer to return the files; the second for breach of
contract against all defendants. On December 31, 1990, the trial
court granted the writ of replevin for the pendency of the action
or until further order of the court and ordered the return of the
files to RSI. The two actions were subsequently consolidated.
On January 14, 1993, defendants moved for summary
judgment on the ground that plaintiffs lacked standing because
they were not parties to, and had no rights under, the
December 13, 1988, written agreement between Insurance, Inc., and
Shields Insurance, Inc. On February 26, 1993, following a
hearing before Third District Judge Leslie A. Lewis, an unsigned
minute entry was made which reads in pertinent part:
This case is before the court for
hearing on defendant's motion for summary
judgment, appearances as shown above.
The motion is argued to the court by
counsel and submitted. The court being fully
advised grants the motion for summary
judgment, as read into the record.
On March 4, 1993, with neither a signed order granting
defendants' motion nor a signed judgment entering summary
judgment in favor of defendants, plaintiffs filed a "Motion for
Reconsideration11 of the trial court's bench ruling. Plaintiffs
based their motion on Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 59, asserting
that they had obtained "newly discovered evidence."3 This new
3

Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 59(a) provides in pertinent

part:
Subject to the provisions of Rule 61, a
new trial may be granted to all or any of the
parties and on all or part of the issues, for
any of the following causes; provided,
however, that on a motion for a new trial in
an action tried without a jury, the court may
open the judgment if one has been entered,
take additional testimony, amend findings of
fact and conclusions of law or make new
findings and conclusions, and direct the
entry of a new judgment:
(4) Newly discovered evidence,
material for the party making the
(Continued on the next page.)
3
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evidence was set forth in two affidavits filed with the motion:
one by William Schmitt, a former employee of both RSI and Shields
Insurance, Inc., and one by Ron Shepherd. Both affidavits
supported plaintiffs7 claim that there was an oral agreement
among the parties that RSI would assume Insurance, Inc.'s rights
and responsibilities under the December 1988 agreement.
Defendants filed a memorandum in opposition to
plaintiffs' motion, but before the trial court could consider the
matter, plaintiffs moved for the recusal of Judge Lewis on the
basis of alleged feelings of animosity between Ron Shepherd and
Judge Lewis's brother. In an unsigned minute entry, Judge Lewis
found that she "could be impartial and fair, but to avoid even
the appearance of impropriety," recused herself from the case.
At no time did Judge Lewis sign an order granting defendants'
motion for summary judgment or a judgment entering summary
judgment in favor of defendants.
The case was subsequently reassigned to Third District
Judge John A. Rokich. On September 7, 1993, following a hearing
on plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration, Judge Rokich denied
the same in a signed order which reads:
Plaintiffs' Motion for reconsideration
of the summary judgment previously granted in
this matter, came before the Court for
hearing on August 24, 1992. . . . After
reviewing the memoranda of the parties and
hearing the arguments of counsel, the Court
hereby enters the following:
ORDER
Plaintiffs' Motion for reconsideration
of the summary judgment previously entered is
hereby denied and defendants are granted
judgment against plaintiff.
Plaintiffs appeal, challenging (1) Judge Lewis's
February 26, 1993, bench ruling granting defendants' motion for
summary judgment and (2) Judge Rokich's September 7, 1993, order
denying their motion for reconsideration and entering summary
judgment in favor of defendants.

3

(Footnote continued.)
application, which he could not, with
reasonable diligence, have discovered
and produced at trial.
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JUDGE LEWIS'S BENCH RULING
As an initial matter, we address plaintiffs' attempt to
challenge Judge Lewis's February 26, 1993, bench ruling on
defendants' motion for summary judgment. That ruling appeared
only as an unsigned minute entry. It is well settled that " [a]n
unsigned minute entry does not constitute an entry of judgment,
nor is it a final judgment for purposes of [appeal].11 Wilson v.
Manning, 645 P.2d 655, 655 (Utah 1982); accord State v. Crowley,
737 P.2d 198, 198-99 (Utah 1987); South Salt Lake v. Burton, 718
P.2d 405, 406 (Utah 1986); Steadman v. Lake Hills, 20 Utah 2d 61,
63, 433 P.2d 1, 3 (1967); Hartford Accidenr & Indem. Co. v.
Clegg, 103 Utah 414, 419, 135 P.2d 919, 922 (1943). Because
Judge Lewis never signed an order granting defendants' motion for
summary judgment nor entered judgment thereon, there is not a
final order or judgment by Judge Lewis to be considered. The
only appealable order in this case is Judge Rokich's September 7,
1993, order denying plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration and
granting summary judgment in favor of defendants.
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
On appeal, plaintiffs argue that Judge Rokich erred in
denying their motion for reconsideration of Judge Lewis's bench
ruling on deiendant's motion for summary judgment.4 Defendants
As noted above, after Judge Lewis stated from the bench
that she was granting defendants' motion, plaintiffs filed a
motion for reconsideration, asserting a right to file their
motion under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 59's provision that a
trial court may open a judgment and enter a new judgment on the
basis of "newly discovered evidence." Plaintiffs' motion was
supported by two affidavits stating that Ron Shepherd and the
Shieldses had orally agreed that RSI would assume Insurance,
Inc.'s rights and responsibilities under the December 1988
agreement between Shields Insurance, Inc., and Insurance, Inc.
Defendants opposed plaintiffs' motion, asserting that (1) the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure do not provide for such a motion,
and (2) that if the motion was deemed proper under rule 59, the
affidavits did not qualify as "newly discovered evidence" because
the facts averred therein were known to the affiants prior to
Judge Lewis's bench ruling.
Concerning defendants' first argument, this court has
consistently held that our rules of civil procedure do not
provide for a motion for reconsideration of a trial court's order
or judgment, see, e.g.. Watkiss & Campbell v. Foa & Son, 808 P.2d
1061, 1064 (Utah 1991); Tracy v. University of Utah Hosp., 619
P.2d 340, 342 (Utah 1980); Peav v. Peay, 607 P.2d 841, 842-43
(Utah 1980) ; Utah State Employees Credit Union v. Riding, 24 Utah
2d 211, 214, 469 P.2d 1, 3 (1970), but has reviewed motions so
entitled if they could have properly been brought under some rule
(Continued on the next page.)
5
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respond that (1) plaintiffs' motion was not properly before the
trial court because plaintiffs did not meet any of the
circumstances specified in rule 59 that permit relief under that
rule, and (2) even considering plaintiffs' "newly discovered
evidence," the trial court nonetheless correctly denied
plaintiffs7 motion for reconsideration.
Rule 59, according to its plain language, applies only
to motions for new trials or amendments of judgments.
Plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration of Judge Lewis's bench
ruling was therefore not properly brought under that rule since
no signed order or judgment was ever entered as a consequence of
that ruling. There was no order or judgment signed by Judge
Lewis to be reviewed under rule 59.
It is settled law that a trial court is free to
reassess it's decision at any point prior to entry of a final
order or judgment. Bennion v. Hansen, 699 P.2d 757, 760 (Utah
1985) . In the present case, because no final order awarding
defendants summary judgment was signed and entered, the matter
was still pending when plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration was
filed in Judge Lewis's court. She had every right to fully
reassess the matter and, if deemed appropriate, to receive
additional evidence. When Judge Lewis recused herself and the
matter was assigned to Judge Rokich, he likewise had every right
to fully review the matter.
Pursuant to his authority to hear this matter, Judge
Rokich heard plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration on August 23,
1993, and on September 7, 1993, issued an order denying the same.
However, that order fails to state his grounds for denying the
motion. While Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a) does not
require findings of fact in regard to summary judgments, the rule
does require a written statement by the court of the grounds for

4

(Footnote continued.)
and were merely incorrectly titled. See, e.g., Watkiss, 808 P.2d
at 1064-65. In the present case, because Judge Lewis never
signed an order granting defendants' motion for summary judgment
nor entered judgment thereon, plaintiffs' motion for
reconsideration was, in essence, not a motion for reconsideration
at all, but simply a reargument of their opposition to
defendants' motion for summary judgment, which a trial court is
free to entertain at any point prior to entry of a final order or
judgment. See, e.g., Bennion v. Hansen, 699 P.2d 757, 760 (Utah
1985). Accordingly, it was not improper for the trial court to
consider plaintiffs' motion or for this court to consider it on
appeal.
5

See supra note 3.
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its decision.6 This was not done in the present case. This is
especially significant here because, due to the lack of a
transcript, we cannot ascertain whether Judge Rokich considered
all of the issues concerning defendants' motion for summary
judgment or simply the "new evidence" presented by plaintiffs in
their motion for reconsideration or whether Judge Rokich based
his order and judgment solely on defendants' argument in their
memorandum opposing plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration that
our rules of civil procedure do not provide for such a motion,
which, while true, is irrelevant to the case at bar. See supra
note 4. Because failure to issue a statement of grounds is
generally not reversible error, see Neerings v. Utah State Bar,
817 P.2d 320, 323 (Utah 1991), we do not remand on this ground
but proceed to address plaintiffs' appeal from the gram: of
summary judgment in Judge Rokich's September 7, 1993, order.'
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Summary judgment is proper only when no genuine issues
of material fact remain and the moving party is enrirled ro
judgment as a matter of law. Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c); Hicains v.
Salt Lake County, 855 P.2d 231, 235 (Utah 1993). Because we
resolve only legal issues on appeal from a summary judgment:, we
do not defer to the trial court's rulings. Ferree v. State, 784
P.2d 149, 151 (Utah 1989); accord Higgins, 855 P.2d at 235. "We
6

Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a) provides, with our
emphasis:
In all actions tried upon the facts
without a jury or with an advisory jury, the
court shall find the facts specially and
state separately its conclusions of law
thereon. . . . Findings of fact, whether
based on oral or documentary evidence, shall
not be set aside unless clearly erroneous
. . • . The trial court need not enter
findings of fact and conclusions of law in
ruling on motions, except as provided in
Rule 41(b). The court shall, however, issue
a brief written statement of the ground for
its decision on all motions granted under
Rules 12(b), 50(a) and (b), 56, and 59 when
the motion is based on more than one ground.
7

We do, however, "take this opportunity to remind trial
judges that the presumption of correctness ordinarily afforded
trial court rulings *has little operative effect when members of
this court cannot divine the trial court's reasoning because of
the cryptic nature of its ruling.'" Retherford v. AT&T
Communications of the Mountain States, Inc., 844 P.2d 949, 958
n.4 (Utah 1992) (quoting Allen v. Prudential Property & Casualty
Ins. Co., 839 P.2d 798, 800 (Utah 1992)).
7
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determine only whether the trial court erred in applying the
governing law and whether the trial court correctly held that
there were no disputed issues of material fact." Ferree, 784
P.2d at 151 (citing Bushnell Real Estate, Inc. v. Nielson. 672
P.2d 746, 749 (Utah 1983); Bowen v. Riverton City, 656 P.2d 434,
436 (Utah 1982)).
"Summary judgment allows the parties to pierce the
pleadings to determine whether a material issue of fact exists
that must be resolved by the fact finder." Lamb v. B & B
Amusements Corp., 869 P.2d 926, 928 (Utah 1993) (citing Reagan
Outdoor Advertising, Inc. v. Lundqren. 692 P.2d 776, 779 (Utah
1984); Webster v. Sill, 675 P.2d 1170, 1172 (Utah 1983)). In
accordance with this rule, ,f[t]he party moving for summary
judgment must establish a right to judgment based on the
applicable law as applied to an undisputed material issue of
fact. A party opposing the motion is reguired only to show that
there is a material issue of fact." Id. (emphasis added)
(citations omitted). Moreover, as to questions concerning
material issues of fact, "[a]ffidavits and depositions submitted
in support of and in opposition to a motion for summary judgment
may be used only to determine whether a material issue of fact
exists, not to determine whether one party's case is less
persuasive than another's or is not likely to succeed in a trial
on the merits." Id. Accordingly, "[bjecause this is an appeal
from a summary judgment, we review the factual submissions to the
trial court in a light most favorable to finding a material issue
of fact." Versluis v. Guaranty Nat'l Cos., 842 P.2d 865, 867
(Utah 1992) (citing King v. Searle Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 832
P.2d 858 (Utah 1992)). "A genuine issue of fact exists where, on
the basis of the facts in the record, reasonable minds could
differ" on any material issue. Jackson v. Dabnev, 645 P.2d 613,
615 (Utah 1982).
Applying these principles to the case at bar, we
conclude that material issues of fact remain that require
reversal and remand of this case. At the time of plaintiffs'
motion for reconsideration before Judge Rokich, the record
included plaintiffs' complaint and the affidavits supporting
their motion. 8 Plaintiffs' complaint alleged in pertinent part:

As we have already stated, plaintiffs' motion was
premature because Judge Lewis's ruling had not been reduced to a
written judgment. It therefore follows that the affidavits were
of no force or effect in connection with that premature motion.
However, when the case was later assigned to Judge Rokich and he
conducted his hearing, which was in essence a reargument of the
motion for summary judgment, it was within his discretion to
consider the affidavits in connection with that motion,
especially because defendants did not move to strike them as
untimely filed or not otherwise properly before the court.
Mo. Q10475
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10. It was agreed between the sellers
and the purchasers that all insurance written
through the Shields Agency prior to December
of 1988 would be changed to show Shepherd as
the agent of record and all insurance written
by the Shields Defendants after December of
1988 would be written through Shepherd.
Plaintiffs' affidavits in support of their motion for
reconsideration, one by William Schmitt, a former employee of
both RSI and Shields Insurance, Inc., and one by Ron Shepherd,
both alleged the existence of an oral agreement between Ron
Shepherd and the Shieldses that RSI would assume Insurance,
Inc.'s rights and responsibilities under the written agreemenr
between Insurance, Inc., and Shields Insurance, Inc.
Specifically, Schmitt's affidavit stated in pertinent parr:
4. During the latter part of the month
of December 1988, [Schmitt] was present when
Jeffrey Shields and William Scott Shields
told William Gerald Shields that if the sale
of the Shields Agency was to be completed, it
would have to be done through [RSI], not
Insurance Inc.
5. [Schmitt] and all other salaried
employees of the Shields Agency received
their pay checks covering the period
December 15 through 31, 1988 from [RSI].
6. On or about January 15, 1989,
[Schmitt] and all other employees of the
Shields Insurance Agency moved to . . . the
insurance offices of [RSI].
7. Effective December 31, 1988,
[Schmitt] and all other salaried employees
who worked for the Shields Agency became
employees of [RSI] and received their payroll
checks from the said [RSI] thereafter.
Ron Shepherd's affidavit stated in pertinent part:
7. Immediately after the Sales
Agreement [between Shields Insurance, Inc.,
and Insurance, Inc.,] was signed, [Shepherd]
contacted all insurance carriers with whom
[Shepherd] and the Shields defendants would
be placing insurance to obtain an appointment
of Insurance Inc. as an insurance agency.
8. [Shepherd] soon found that at
December of 1988, no major insurance carriers
Q
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were appointing new agents, therefore, no
insurance could be written by Insurance Inc.
9. This fact was disclosed by
[Shepherd] to the Shields defendants just
prior to Christmas of 1988, whereupon, all
parties agreed that the purchaser of the
Shields Agency would have to be changed from
Insurance Inc.
10. For the reasons stated above, the
Sales Agreement was orally modified at that
time by all of the parties; however, the
written agreement between the parties was not
changed and signed by the parties.
11. The oral agreement reached by the
parties just prior to Christmas of 1988, was
implemented on a day to day basis; all
insurance written by the Shields defendants
was written through [RSI] as agency of record
and no insurance was written through
Insurance Inc.
12. The agreement that the buy out
would be by [RSI] was made by all the parties
prior to the time that the Shields defendants
accepted money from [Shepherd] to pay their
bills and prior to the time that the Shields
defendants moved their offices into the
offices of [RSI] . . . .
Defendants did not file countering affidavits in response to
plaintiffs' affidavits.9
The allegations in plaintiffs' complaint, along with
plaintiffs' affidavits, are clearly sufficient to raise questions
of material fact concerning the existence of the oral agreement
between the parties and, if it did exist, whether the alleged
oral agreement was actually a modification of the prior written
agreement or was a new contract between Ron Shepherd and the
Shieldses that simply embraced the same terms as the written
agreement between Insurance, Inc., and Shields Insurance,

9

We note that even if countering affidavits had been filed,
it would not change the outcome of this case because the
existence of countering affidavits would plainly indicate that
issues of material fact were in dispute.

Inc.10
Additional material issues of fact
exist concerning the
actual parties who entered the oral agreement, that is, whether
the Shieldses and Shepherd entered the oral agreement as
individuals or on behalf of Shields Insurance, Inc., and
Insurance, Inc., respectively, and if they entered the oral
agreement on behalf of the two corporations, whether such could
be done in light of the language of the written agreement.
Accordingly, we conclude that issues of material fact remain that
preclude an award of summary judgment in the present case.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the trial court's order and
judgment denying plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration and
granting judgment in favor of defendants is reversed and remanded
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

WE CONCUR:

Michael D. Zimmerman, Chief
Justice

I. Daniel Stewart, Associate
Chief Justice

Richard C. Howe, Justice

Christine M. Durham, Justice

10

The record also reveals inconsistencies as to whether
Shields Insurance, Inc., is a c t u a l * y < ? cor P°ration. In the
December 1988 written agreement and throughout the early part of
the proceedings below, it is referred to as Shields Insurance,
Inc. Later, Shields Insurance, *™J*# J s changed to simply the
Shields Agency. This matter shqulfl-aiso be addressed on remand.
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